What next for Ethiopia — U.S. relations?

“You know what the problem is? I will tell you as a former citizen of the Soviet Union. The problem of Empires is that they think that they are so powerful that they can afford small errors and mistakes. We will buy these (people), bully those, make a deal with those, give necklaces to some, threaten others with battleships, and this will solve all the problems. But problems accumulate, and there comes a time when they can no longer be dealt with. And the United States, with great determination, is following right in the Soviet Union’s footsteps.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin made these remarks in June 2021 at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Putin’s comments came just days before his meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden, and as the U.S. imposed a range of sanctions on Russia in April 2021.

Putin’s words seem almost prophetic as the Taliban advanced to take over Kabul at a lightning speed three months later in August 2021. With the more than three hundred thousand U.S.-trained Afghan armed forces failing to defend the nation, which the Americans helped to build over 21 years of “war on terror” in Afghanistan.

Many people compared the images coming out of Kabul to the fall of Saigon in 1975. Many also likened the U.S. to the Soviet Union and the British Empire, both of which sought to control Afghanistan but were forced to leave — the British in 1842 and the soviets in 1989.

Events in Afghanistan are undoubtedly one of the many signs that the American century, at least the part of the century where the Americans dominated the political landscape of the Middle East and Eurasia, is declining. The growing call for climate action and the global cry to end dependence on fossil fuel, the rise of China, and Russia asserting its influence in Europe along with Brexit, the yet unknown full impact of COVID 19 pandemic, are all the writings on the wall for a declining American power worldwide, possible crumbling of the E.U. and disband of NATO.

Africa is no island not to be affected by this changing global order and nowhere can this be seen and felt in the African continent than in Ethiopia.

Except for the period between 1973 and 1991, Ethiopia and the United States have enjoyed a solid bilateral partnership since they established a formal diplomatic relationship in 1903. The United States has undoubtedly played a considerable role in the rise of Ethiopia as an anchor state in the Horn of Africa region in particular and Africa in general. Between 1947 and 1973, almost 1/3 of all U.S. foreign aid in Africa went to Ethiopia. Ethiopia remained a staunch supporter and champion of the United States, and Israel in Africa, both at the United Nations and the Organization for African Unity (OAU).

The U.S. — Ethiopia bilateral relationship went downhill in 1973 when Ethiopia severed its diplomatic relations with Israel during the Yom Kippur war. At the time, a growing number of African countries were severing their relationship with Israel, primarily influenced by the “Arab block” in the OAU. There were even calls to relocate the headquarter of the OAU from Addis Abeba to Tripoli, and Ethiopia could no longer resist and defend Israel nor the United States in the OAU.

Ethiopia’s decision to sever its diplomatic relation with Israel in 1973 might have been the last straw that broke the camel’s back in the U.S. — Ethiopia bilateral relationship at the time. However, already Hailesialsie seemed to have seen the writings on the wall. He planned to further strengthen Ethiopia’s relationship with its allies to the east, particularly with China, as reflected by his visit to China and meeting with Mao Zedong in October 1971.

Following the coup d’état and assassination of Hailesialsie in 1974, it appears the United States had hoped Ethiopia would become some sort of Republic with constitutional monarchy. The hope was to restore the Eritrean confederation that was discharged in 1962, and secure the U.S. national interest in the re-confederated state of Eritrea (the Kagnew military base in Asmara to ensure safe navigation in the Red Sea).

However, negotiations to restore the confederation failed as members of the Derg military council in charge of Ethiopia following the coup d’état refused the proposal and killed General Aman Andom of Eritrea, interim head of the Ethiopian government at the time. The Eritreans would then reinvigorate the separatist movement (Jebha) that was already in its primordial stage while receiving some support from the Arab countries.

Following the coup d’état that removed Hailesialsie, a plethora of political parties mushroomed in Ethiopia. Among these are the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Eritrean Liberation Front (EPLF). True to its nature, given that the United States came to existence as a nation after fighting a war of independence from the British Empire, the U.S. overtly and covertly supported these separatist groups.

The separatist groups aspired to “liberate” the people they claimed to represent from “the Ethiopian Empire.” The Derg regime led by Mengistu Hailemariam vowed to maintain Ethiopia’s unity and territorial integrity, seeking assistance from wherever it could find. In this regard, allying with the Soviet Union was a no-brainer.

As the cold war raged, Ethiopia faced an all-out assault on its territorial integrity and unity when Somalia invaded Ethiopia in 1977. The United States, under the pretext of supporting “the self-determination right of the Ogaden Somali in Ethiopia,” channeled all sorts of military equipment to Somalia via Egypt.

However, Ethiopia managed to route the invading troops of Somalia with the help and support of Cuban soldiers, who helped Ethiopia with the backing and support of the Soviet Union. The soviet backed Ethiopian government then focused its attention on the north and fought for 17 years to defend the nation until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

When the cold war ended, Mengistu lost soviet support, and the U.S.-backed separatists assumed central power in Ethiopia. The separatists suspended the constitution and orchestrated Eritrea’s cessation with the full backing and support of the United States, while there was no constitution in 1993.

The U.S. hoped to secure its national interest in Eritrea once Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia. However, that hope never materialized. Eritrea is now a “Pariah” and “North Korea” state in Africa for refusing to accommodate the U.S. demands.

In the meantime, the TPLF would reconstitute Ethiopia along ethnic lines, using a constitution that was ratified in 1994, after the cessation of Eritrea. It appears winners of the Cold War sought to form a Yugoslavia like state in Ethiopia, much like winners of the First World War created the actual Yugoslavia.

However, this project of ethnic federalism and “Yugoslavia in Ethiopia” failed to materialize despite being implemented for 27 years. Popular apprising ousted the dominant TPLF from central power, and the TPLF retreated to Mekele, Tigray, in 2018.

If the U.S.-backed Yugoslavia project in Ethiopia worked, TPLF would have been content in governing its own separate “ethnic state of Tigray,” and Ethiopia would have disintegrated as Yugoslavia did by now.

However, the facts and reality on the ground are contrary to this. Neither the Tigrayans nor any other “Ethnic State” in Ethiopia can survive without Ethiopia’s collective as a nation. The TPLF and its backers know this much. Thus, the prospect of an “independent state of Tigray” remains bleak if not dead. That was why the TPLF tried everything in its capacity to return to its once-dominant role in the Ethiopian social and political landscape, by any means necessary, including by an armed rebellion and insurrection to oust the central government.

Regrettably, the U.S. continues to undermine the central government in Ethiopia and is overtly and covertly supporting the TPLF. As a result, the U.S. — Ethiopia bilateral relationship is probably at its lowest point and taking a more adversarial route, almost returning to what it was between 1973 and 1991. During this period, the U.S. did not have an ambassador in Ethiopia, and it maintained a Chargé d’affaires.

At the moment, the main question lingering around the minds of many Ethiopians is whether Ethiopia needs the U.S. more than the U.S. needs Ethiopia? And what would Ethiopia lose if it ends the long-standing bilateral relationship with the U.S.? Answers to similar questions to the United States are apparent. The United States does not need Ethiopia more than Ethiopia needs the United States. The U.S. does not lose anything if it ends its relationship with Ethiopia.

The United States generally identifies its foreign policy interest in Africa as it relates to other foreign policy priorities. And priority interest of the United States anywhere in the world centers around two primary issues. The first is safe navigation of Oil from the Arab countries and other petrostates (Solidarity with Israel comes under this). The second is support for U.S. positions and resolutions at the United Nations.

Given the current state of the United Nations and the multipolarity of international relations, the so-called “non-aligned movement” seems to have been disbanded, if not useless, and countries in this U.N. block now align themselves with any of the superpowers that have their best interest. Ethiopia is no different in this regard. It has increasingly aligned itself with China, Russia and emerging power India at the U.N.

When it comes to the safe navigation of Oil from the Arab countries and other petrostates, the United States, more than any other country in the world, depends on 16 straits of the global maritime trade route. These straits are Strait of Hormuz (between Oman and Iran at the entrance to the Persian Gulf), Bab-el-Mandeb (passage from the Arabian Sea to the Red Sea Yemen and Socotra), Strait of Malacca (between Malaysia and Indonesia), Panama Canal and the Panama Pipeline (connecting the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans), Suez Canal and the Sumed Pipeline (connecting the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea, Egypt), Strait of Gibraltar (along the Atlantic Ocean entering the Mediterranean Sea, Spain, Gibraltar and Morocco), Strait of Dover or English Channel (separating the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea, England and France), Strait of Magellan (Chile), Beagle Channel (Chile and Argentina), Drake Passage, The Cape of Good Hope (South Africa), Bering Strait (United States of America and Russia), Bosporus Strait (linking the Black Sea and Oil coming from the Caspian Sea region to the Mediterranean Sea, Turkey), Dardanelles Strait (connecting the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean Sea, Turkey), Strait of Tartary (along Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk, Russia).

The U.S. depends on these 16 straits more than any other country in the world because, without safe passage and navigation along these 16 straits, the U.S. remains an isolated and lonely country with only two neighbors, Canada and Mexico, and surrounded by two giant oceans, the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

Ethiopia, as a land-locked country, has nothing to offer the U.S. in this regard. Ensuring safe navigation along the red sea maritime trade routes primarily depends on the region’s coastal borders along the Red Sea. The U.S. priority interest in the Red Sea therefore primarily rests with Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia. Thus, the U.S. does not lose much in this regard if it loses its relationship with Ethiopia.

On the other hand, Ethiopia receives humanitarian assistance and food aid from the United States. As the U.S. embassy recently noted, America feeds 7% of Ethiopians (the majority of them in Tigray). This aid is in return for the stability and security of Ethiopia, so Ethiopia won’t crumble and disrupt the peace and security of the other countries in the region upon which the U.S. relies heavily.

Humanitarian assistance and food Aid is also supposed to ensure some policy flexibility in the Ethiopian body politic to ensure the U.S. interest as it relates to other foreign policy priorities, for instance, to ensure Egypt’s water security and “historic rights to the waters of the Nile,” or in exchange for sending soldiers in places like Somalia, Darfur and other areas so Ethiopian soldiers fight the wars that the American soldiers won’t fight themselves.

Given these realities of the U.S. Ethiopia bilateral relationship, it is not surprising if many Ethiopians ask themselves if Ethiopia and Ethiopians really need to maintain the U.S. Ethiopia bilateral relationship.